DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 286 813 SO 018 502

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TITLE Watergate: A Teaching Unit. Curriculum Project Report No. 4040. Experimental Edition.
INSTITUTION New York City Board of Education, Brooklyn, N.Y. Div. of Educational Planning and Support.
PUB DATE Jun 77
NOTE 75p.
AVAILABLE FROM New York City Board of Education, Div. of Curriculum and Instruction, 131 Livingston Street, Rm. 613, Brooklyn, NY ($3.00).
PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom Use - Guides (For Teachers) (052)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Citizenship Education; Constitutional Law; Instructional Materials; Political Attitudes; Political Campaigns; Political Influences; Political Power; *Politics; Secondary Education; *Social Studies; United States Government (Course); *United States History; Units of Study
IDENTIFIERS *Nixon (Richard M); United States Constitution; *Watergate

ABSTRACT

Because Watergate tested the strength of the U.S. constitutional system and proved that it worked, this unit could serve as a focal point for study of the U.S. Constitution. The three objectives of the document are: (1) to expand knowledge of the governance process through study of the separation of powers, the impeachment process, the right to privacy, and the electoral process; (2) to develop skills that promote critical thinking and analysis of issues by using reference sources; and (3) to develop attitudes congruent with citizen participation in a democratic society by affirming belief in the ideals of U.S. democracy and in the democratic process as a way of achieving those ideals. The first theme, "Presidential Power in the United States," presents events that culminated in the "imperial presidency," and the resulting corrupt practices in trying to gain and hold that position. The second theme, "Curbing the Powers of the President," discusses the constitutional limitations of presidential power. The third theme, "Political Morality," delves into the political practices that made Watergate possible. Activities and questions to enhance the discussions are included, and a bibliography is appended. (SM)

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CURRICULUM PROJECT REPORT

A TEACHING UNIT

Project No. 4040 : June 1977

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Acknowledgements

This experimental Bulletin, Watergate: A Teaching Unit, was prepared as a cooperative effort of the Curriculum Planning and Policy Unit, Leonard Simon, Assistant Director, and the Center for the Humanities and the Arts, Florence Jackson, Center Director. Arnold Webb, Executive Director, Division of Educational Planning and Support, provided overall supervision.

Dorothy Silverman, School Research Associate, DEP&S, administered the Curriculum Writing Program. Albert Post, Assistant Director, Center for the Humanities and the Arts, guided the project.

Elizabeth E. Malament, Professor of Education at Long Island University, on assignment, prepared the document.

Joseph Feld, Dissemination Unit, designed the cover.

FOREWORD

President Gerald R. Ford called Watergate "our long national nightmare." The term Watergate is used to encompass a full blown scandal of many parts. There is evidence of pay-off; evidence of breaking and entering; evidence of political harassment, of taking campaign contributions illegally, of improper use of government agencies. At the heart of it all was the question whether our constitutional form of government would continue.

The study of Watergate should serve to strengthen in our youth commitment to democratic values and faith in the institutions of constitutional government. Because, in the end, the "system," with all its imperfections, worked.

Teachers in the New York City public schools have an obligation to lead students in objective studies of the controversial issues, personalities and events of Watergate. Learning about Watergate should serve to reenforce the words of Supreme Court Justice, Louis D. Brandeis, "Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."

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Introduction

On June 17, 1972, employees of the Committee to Reelect the President were caught breaking into Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington, D. C. Although it was some time before the full significance of the event was understood, the impact on the schools was rapid, direct, and varied.

Almost as soon as the transgressions became known, a mea culpa syndrome began to develop among educators. The question was raised that if unconscionable and illegal acts could have been committed by prestigious former students, who were revealed to be perjurers, plumbers, and purloiners in the White House inner sanctum, then have pupils not been instilled with a moral sense by their teachers? Out of this sense of failure and culpability, some teachers and pupils became engulfed in a crescendo of cynicism which hindered learning and teaching. Others suggested an immediate and total revision of the objectives, content, classroom approaches, and evaluation methods of the social studies curriculum. Still others preferred to treat Watergate by silent neglect. Possibly out of fear that the White House "enemies list" reflected a McCarthyite revival, possibly out of a sincere, if misguided, desire to keep emotionally charged issues out of the classroom, there were teachers who consciously and deliberately avoided class consideration of Watergate.

None of these positions is reflected in this bulletin. Admittedly, the high school must shoulder their share of the total national responsibility for the moral and spiritual malaise apparent in the events of Watergate. Indeed, it may even be true that by our cavalier treatment of factual

data, and by our all-too-willing elimination from the curriculum of anything considered difficult, we may really be guilty of graduating young people who are not only uninformed and unconcerned about the origin, structure, and operations of government, but who often have contempt for the so-called "eggheads" who consider these things important. It may also be that the commendable desire to avoid indoctrination has resulted in total neglect of value formation. It does not follow, however, that the schools alone are responsible for the breakdown of moral values apparent in Watergate. At least equally responsible is the segment of society which apathetically accepts misfeasance and malfeasance in office as "politics as usual," and which sees Watergate as really "no big deal."

Nor does it follow that the existing social studies curriculum needs to be scrapped in order to respond to the educational demands made by all who are shocked and angered by Watergate. The educational principles which undergird the present social studies sequence remain sound. What is necessary is that there be effective implementation of the generally accepted objectives. It is also necessary that social studies teachers not succumb to the idea that "there's nothing so stale as yesterday's headlines"; that Watergate is over and done with; that this is a time for forgetting, forgiving, and healing. Quite the contrary. All teachers, social studies teachers in particular, have the obligation to try to preserve the sense of moral indignation in a determined way to prevent future Watergates.

How To Use This Bulletin

It is to assist in the prevention of future Watergates that these materials have been prepared and distributed. Although intended for use in the secondary schools, teachers of young pupils may find some of the material helpful. Whether Watergate be taught as a separate current topic or be integrated with units in the present K-12 sequence is, of course, left to the judgement of each teacher, based on assessment of the needs, interests, and competencies of pupils. For teachers who prefer the latter approach, the appropriate syllabus for the grade should be examined to locate topics or themes, the study of which might logically or psychologically include Watergate materials. Suggested activities and questions for further study follow Themes I, II, and III, respectively.

A brief chronology (up to the time of this writing) is included, not to present to classes for pupil mastery, but for the convenience of the busy teacher. This material and other data, it is hoped, will be used to illustrate long-range trends in American political development. The chance of another Watergate within the lifetime of those now in high school is slight; we cannot predict the form, shape, time, or impact of the next political scandal. For this reason, it is less important that pupils learn the precise events and cast of characters of Watergate than that they have the kind of learning experience that will help them face and handle the varied, and, as yet, unforeseen corruption of their own adult world.

Objectives

In a very simple but basic sense there is only one reason why pupils should learn about the series of related events commonly known as Watergate: so that they never personally participate in, and never actively or passively condone such activities in others. The objective, in short, is that pupils behave in a manner appropriate to citizens in a democracy, behavior which combines personal responsibility and commitment with cooperative action in organized groups to enhance the general welfare.

Behavior is influenced by personal internalization of attitudes, skills, and knowledge. To behave in socially desirable ways, it is therefore necessary that pupils form, change, or reinforce certain attitudes; that they acquire or strengthen certain skills; that they formulate concepts based on definite knowledge. A few examples of such objectives are listed; others will be suggested by the social studies syllabi for grades 7-12.

Knowledge

Pupils:

- Explain the meaning and significance of such terms as separation of powers, impeachment, freedom of the press, right to privacy.
- Locate and interpret provisions in the Constitution of the United States relating to these principles, procedures, and rights.
- Point out similarities and differences between the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and the near impeachment of Richard Nixon.
- Demonstrate knowledge of the electoral process with special emphasis on the role of political parties and campaign financing.

Skills

Pupils:

. Use sources critically; identify major issues, causal and other relationships; detect evidence of bias.

. Distinguish fact from opinion, reality from myth, self-serving rationalization from reasoned explanation.

. Suspend judgment in controversial issues until there are enough data that can support a conclusion.

. Synthesize generalizations from data.

. Take appropriate action, individually and as members of a group.

Attitudes

Pupils:

. Affirm their belief in the ideals of American democracy and in the democratic process as a way of achieving the ideals.

. Reject the cynical attitude that corruption is endemic and inevitable in the United States.

. Express a sense of outrage against those who violate constitutional provisions or democratic principles.

. Demonstrate faith in the power of the individual to contribute to progress in achieving the ideals of American democracy.

Given the relatively short time a pupil will be studying Watergate-related material, they cannot expect to complete achievement of these objectives. Nor is it necessary. Since, as John Dewey points out, the goal of education is more education and the aim of growth is more growth, then it is really necessary only to start the process, to whet the pupil's appetite for knowledge, to help him learn how to learn, and to experience the excitement of a job well done. The pupil can be introduced to a wide range of

sources of information and be given practice in the discriminating use of such sources to aid in critical thinking. He can begin to develop a commitment to continuous doubting and questioning, to openness to all alternatives, to forming and defending judgments, and to a conviction that his behavior as an individual and as a member of a group does affect the welfare of society.

Selected Watergate-Related Topics

Theme I: Presidential Power in the United States

Overview

The "imperial presidency" to which Richard Nixon succeeded in 1968 was a more powerful office than any other man had ever occupied. The President's domestic authority and American worldwide economic, diplomatic, and military commitments involved supervision of a network of bureaucracies operating at home and overseas, the scope and complexity of which had become virtually unmanageable. Most awesome of all was his power to order the use of armed forces that could destroy the world, a power that only a very few others have ever had.

This enormous extension in the power of the Presidency transformed its character from one of three coequal branches of government (envisioned by the founders), and from that of President as "tribune of all the people" (fashioned by Andrew Jackson) into a kind of monarch who lived and traveled in royal splendor, who, at times, told his subjects only what he thought they ought to know, and who used the Constitution, laws, and agencies of the nation in ways he considered necessary to achieve his purposes.

It is little wonder that in order to hold on to such power, one incumbent, Richard Nixon, initiated or sanctioned a range of acitivities including such overtly illegal acts as electronic surveillance of "enemies" and the Watergate break-in. It is little wonder that the need to cover up the break-in became so crucial as to be almost obsessive. Too much power was at stake. Too many abuses of power might be uncovered.

How did such a situation develop in the United States?

I. What does the Constitution say about the powers of the President?

A. Provision of Article II, sections 2 and 3

B. Reasons why the framers of the Constitution decided to limit the powers of the executive and establish a system of checks and balances.

1. Importance of historical experience with excessive executive power

a. Growth of royal power in Tudor and Stuart England

b. Authoritarian colonial governors

c. Role of George III in the period preceding the Revolution

2. Political philosophy of the framers of the Constitution

a. Influence of Montesquieu's ideas of separation of power as expressed in Spirit of the Laws

II. How has the power of the American President grown beyond the limits set by the Constitution?

A. Through liberal interpretation of the general phrase in Article II section 1, "the executive power shall be vested in a President...":

1. Interpretation of Alexander Hamilton that this represents almost unlimited power, subject only to exceptions and qualifications in the Constitution, and that powers listed in sections 2 and 3 are principal instances of Presidential power, not parameters.

2. Supreme Court endorsement of this liberal interpretation of presidential power, e.g., Chief Justice Taft in the Meyers Case, 1926.

3. Executive Privilege

a. Extent to which this covers "executive privilege" claimed by Nixon in refusing Congressional and Court requests (even requests by executive special prosecutors) for tapes and testimony.

b. Applicability of executive privilege to personal conversations of the President and his aides when the conversations deal with the commission of a crime.

B. Through abuse of perfectly legitimate power: The President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces secretly orders the bombing of Cambodia without the knowledge or consent of the Congress or the people of the United States.

C. Influence of "strong Presidents": Each extension of power which goes unchallenged, or which survives challenge, becomes a precedent.

1. Andrew Jackson

a. Extended use of presidential veto (more than all his predecessors combined); changed its character from a check on unconstitutional legislation to a weapon enforcing the will of the President.

b. Established total control of the President over his cabinet (Senate censure of Jackson's removal of the Secretary of the Treasury was rescinded).

2. James Polk

a. First used the vast power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

b. Fought the Mexican War from the White House with a minimum of consultation with or dependence upon Congress.

3. Other examples of "strong" presidents: Abraham Lincoln (war powers), Theodore Roosevelt (Caribbean Sea policy), Franklin D. Roosevelt (depression and war powers).

D. Abdication of powers by the Congress: Gulf of Tonkin resolution and financial support for a war in Vietnam which Congress had never declared.

E. Influence of historical circumstances favoring the growth of presidential power.

1. Wars induce Presidents to act, sometimes, in secret, by quick but questionable constitutional means.

a. F. D. Roosevelt's exchange of 50 overage destroyers for air and naval bases in the British West Indies and Bermuda.

b. Harry S. Truman's action in Korea.

c. John F. Kennedy and the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

d. Vietnam activities of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson.

e. Vietnam showed that an American President could begin a sizable war without prior consent of Congress and steadily escalate that war despite opposition of half the Senate and a considerable section of the people.

2. Economic depression: Presidential power was extended to price and wage controls, rationing, etc., because of the need for speedy and decisive action.

3. Threats to internal security of the United States were used to justify a broad range of activities which are otherwise acknowledged to be unconstitutional violations of personal rights. Examples of such violations under Nixon include the Houston plan, the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office, alleged use of the CIA for domestic surveillance.

F. The culmination of all these forces created a situation in which it was possible to convince many otherwise intelligent, moral, and law-abiding people that the need to keep power in the hands of Richard M. Nixon for another four years justified all activities towards that end.

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III. How does the growth of presidential power affect American democracy?

A. Possibility of strengthening democracy by increased ability to meet crises.

B. Possibility of strengthening democracy by invasion of personal rights.

C. Since "power corrupts," the likelihood is that corruption will spread to all activities at the highest levels.

D. Weakening of the principle of checks and balances.

Suggested Activities and Questions for Further Study

Ask pupils to:

Read and interpret the following:

Lord Acton in 1887 wrote a harsh review of a book by a colleague. The book appeared to Acton to excuse many acts of the Popes during the time of the Inquisition. When the author protested the review, Lord Acton pressed his point in a letter which said, in part,[1]

> "In what sense is the Pope not responsible for the Constitution by which he established the new Tribunal?...The person who authorizes to act shares the guilt of the person who commits it...If the thing be criminal, then the authority permitting it bears the guilt...
>
> "You say that people in authority are not to be snubbed or sneered at from our pinnacle of conscious rectitude. I really don't know whether you exempt them because of their rank, or of their success and power, or of their date....I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men with a favoured presumption that they did no wrong.
>
> "If there is any presumption, it is the other way, against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you suppress the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority..."

1. The New York Times (March 13, 1973).

Why does power corrupt? How?

To what extent are Acton's comments regarding the Pope and the Inquisition applicable to Nixon and Watergate?

Explain why you agree or disagree with the last sentence of Acton's letter.

. Explain cartoons showing Richard M. Nixon with crown and sceptre.

. Compare and contrast the concept of King Richard with that of King Andrew or King Franklin.

. Write an editorial explaining Nixon's violations of the Constitution.

. Explain the difference between a position such as the Presidency and the temporary incumbent. Why did Nixon maintain that weakening the latter hurts the former? Defend your own position on this matter.

. Role-play Nixon, Mitchell, Liddy, Magruder, Dean, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, et al, defending themselves before the court of history.

. Role-play jury and judge in that same court of history.

. Write to your Congressman suggesting the kind of legislation that Watergate proves necessary with regard to invasion of privacy and to executive power.

Theme II: Curbing the Power of the President

Overview

The men assembled at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 understood the possibility that a president might exceed or abuse his power. They may have hoped for men of virtue "noble and above all honest," but they prepared for the worst; they created a government to be manned by fallible human beings, not saints. Even without anticipating the enormous increase in presidential power, the founders fashioned a system that would free the government and its various offices from dependency on the character of the temporary incumbent. Periodic electoral approval, separation of powers of the three branches of government, a system of checks and balances, and the ultimate possibility of impeachment were all designed to prevent abuse of power by the president.

In respect to the last of these curbs, the Constitutional Convention followed the British model more closely than in any other provision of the United States Constitution. Thus it is to British usage that one must look (as well as to the framers' own words in debates and in The Federalist Papers) for the intent and meaning of the Constitutional provision for impeachment.

I. How does the Constitution provide for checking abuse of power by a president

   A. Quadrennial elections

   B. Separation of powers; checks and balances

   C. Impeachment: Article II, section 4.

II. Impeachment: The ultimate sanction against abuse of power

   A. Distinction between impeachment by the House of Representatives

and trial for impeachment by the Senate. The wording, according to The Federalist, no. 65, follows the age-old division of function in English law which assigned the role of prosecutor to the Commons while the Lords sat in judgment.

B. Definitions of the terms used

1. Treason - as defined in Article III, section 3

2. Bribery - the most prevalent political crime in the experience of the framers. Madison, at the Constitutional Convention, spoke of a Chief Magistrate who "might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation...." Governeur Morris spoke also of "corrupting his electors."

3. High crimes and misdemeanors - in current American usage, refers to greater and lesser crimes. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the words meant something very different, based on British usage. As first used in proceedings against the Earl of Suffolk, 1386, and in subsequent applications from the 14th to the 17th centuries, impeachment was for misconduct which was not a crime in the general common sense. There was actually no crime under English law known as misdemeanor; lesser crimes were trespasses. Parliament did not need impeachment to proceed against an official who committed an indictable criminal offense; when a crime was committed, they used attainder. The fact that Parliament devised impeachment as a penalty, when they had recourse to attainder for crimes, indicates that impeachment was intended for another kind of offense. The fact that the framers withheld from Congress the power to inflict

criminal punishment, that they limited punishment for impeachment to removal and disqualification (leaving criminal punishment to subsequent indictment and conviction), indicates that they were separating impeachment from the criminal process.

"High crimes and misdemeanors" were political offenses, offenses against the interest of the people, offenses which strike against the people in a fundamental way deliberately destroying a constitutional right. Madison saw impeachment as the way to defend the Community against the incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate which might cause oppression. In Hamilton's words, (The Federalist, No. 65), "the subjects of (impeachment) jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated Political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."

III. Why did the framers include an impeachment clause in the Constitution?

A. The English experience with impeachment.

B. The Colonial experience - most of the original colonies had constitutional provisions for the impeachment of royal officials.

C. The fear of monarchial tendencies in a president.

D. Benjamin Franklin's admonition that the only alternative to impeachment was assassination.

IV. How has impeachment been used in the United States?

A. Against civil officers other than a president

1. The House of Representatives voted for impeachment 12 times.

2. The Senate voted to convict 4 times; all were federal judges.

a. The first instance was in 1797 against an official who allegedly participated in an Indian uprising plot.

b. The last was in 1936 against a judge for allowing his court to fall into "scandal and disrepute."

B. Against a president

1. Andrew Johnson, 1868

a. The House of Representatives voted 128 to 47 to impeach Andrew Johnson on two main charges:

1) He violated a dubious law barring removal of a Cabinet officer (Secretary of State Edward Stanton) without Senate consent.

2) Several of his speeches sought to arouse public contempt of the Congress.

b. The Senate voted 35-19, one less that the 2/3 necessary, for removal from office. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who presided at the trial expressed the hope that "no occasion may ever arise when the same proceedings now in progress will be cited as a precedent...."

2. Richard M. Nixon

a. On October 30, 1973, the House Judiciary Committee, William P. Rodino, Jr., chairman, began consideration of impeachment.

b. In the following months, having examined witnesses and amassed fifteen volumes of testimony, the Committee drew up the following Articles of Impeachment.

RESOLVED, That Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment to be exhibited to the Senate:

ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE NAME OF ITSELF AND OF ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF ITS IMPEACHMENT

ARTICLE I

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, in that:

On June 17, 1972, and prior thereto, agents of the Committee for the Re-election of the President committed unlawful entry of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in Washington, District of Columbia, for the purpose of securing political intelligence. Subsequent thereto, Richard M. Nixon, using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and through his close subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of such illegal entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.

The means used to implement this course of conduct or plan included one or more of the following:

1) making false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States;

2) withholding relevant and material evidence or information from lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States;

3) approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States and false or misleading testimony in duly instituted judicial and congressional proceedings;

4) interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and Congressional Committees;

5) approving, condoning, and acquiescing in, the surreptitious payment of substantial sums of money for the purpose of obtaining the silence or influencing the testimony of witnesses, potential witnesses or individuals who participated in such unlawful entry and other illegal activities;

6) endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of the United States;

7) disseminating information received from officers of the Department of Justice of the United States to subjects of investigations conducted by lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States, for the purpose of aiding and assisting such subjects in their attempts to avoid criminal liability;

8) making or causing to be made false or misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United States into believing that a thorough and complete investigation had been conducted with respect to allegations of misconduct on the part of personnel of the executive branch of the United States and personnel of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, and that there was no involvement of such personnel in such misconduct; or

9) endeavoring to cause prospective defendants, and individuals duly tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in return for their silence or false testimony, or rewarding individuals for their silence or false testimony.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE II

Using the powers of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws governing agencies of the executive branch and the purposes of these agencies.

This conduct has included one or more of the following:

1

He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, confidential information contained in income tax returns for purposes not authorized by law, and to cause, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, income tax audits or other income tax investigations to be initiated or conducted in a discriminatory manner.

2

He misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and other executive personnel, in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens, by directing or authorizing such agencies or personnel to conduct or continue electronic surveillance or other investigations for purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any other lawful function of his office; he did direct, authorize, or permit the use of information obtained thereby for purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any other lawful function of his office; and he did direct the concealment of certain records made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of electronic surveillance.

3

He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens, authorized and permitted to be maintained a secret investigative unit within the office of the President, financed in part with money derived from campaign contributions, which unlawfully utilized the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency, engaged in covert and unlawful activities, and attempted to prejudice the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial.

4

He has failed to take care that the laws were faithfully executed by failing to act when he knew or had reason to know that his close subordinates endeavored to impede and frustrate lawful inquiries by duly constituted executive.

judicial, and legislative entities concerning the unlawful entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, and the cover-up thereof, and concerning other unlawful activities including those relating to the confirmation of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General of the United States, the electronic surveillance of private citizens, the break-in into the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, and the campaign financing practices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

5

In disregard of the rule of law, he knowingly misused the executive power by interfering with agencies of the executive branch, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Criminal Division, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, of the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, in violation of his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE III

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, contrary to his oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has failed without lawful cause or excuse to produce papers and things as directed by duly authorized subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on April 11, 1974, May 15, 1974, May 30, 1974, and June 24, 1974, and willfully disobeyed such subpoenas. The subpoenaed papers and things were deemed necessary by the Committee in order to resolve by direct evidence fundamental, factual questions relating to Presidential direction, knowledge or approval of actions demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial grounds for impeachment of the President. In refusing to produce these papers and things Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives.

In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice, and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

Wherefore, Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

c. The House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend impeachment by 27 to 11 on Article I (obstruction of justice); 28 to 10 on Article II (abuse of power); 21 to 17 on Article III (contempt of Congress for unconstitutional defiance of committee subpoenas). At 7:07 P.M. on Saturday night, August 3, 1974, the Rodino Committee formally decided to recommend the impeachment of Richard M. Nixon.

d. It was expected that the Committee would report the Articles to the full House for its impeachment debate about August 12th, and that the House would vote about August 23.

e. Further impeachment proceedings against Richard Nixon ended with his resignation.

V. The resignation of Richard M. Nixon, August 9, 1974

A. Immediate reasons

1. Unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Richard M. Nixon et al.

a. The ruling that it was an extravagant claim of executive privilege for the President to withhold 64 tapes of his conversations with aides, requested by the special prosecutor and the Rodino Committee, simply on his assertion that it was not in the public interest to release them.

b. The realization by the President that the material on the tapes would be damaging to him.

c. The bipartisan nature of the vote in the House Judiciary Committee to recommend impeachment.

3. The financial advantages of resignation as against dismissal by impeachment.

B. The resignation statement, read over national television at 9 P.M. Thursday evening, August 8th

1. Admitted no guilt.
2. Listed achievements in office.
3. Mentioned mistakes made "in the best interests of the nation."

C. Immediate consequences

1. Mr. Nixon could now be indicted as a co-conspirator and could be called in Watergate-related cases as a defense witness, prosecution witness, or as a defendant.
2. A stock market rally seemed to indicate that the nation considered the events of late July and early August as a sign of the strength of the American system.
3. Foreign reaction was partly passive; mostly, it echoed the sentiments at home, e.g., heavy foreign investment in American industry after the resignation.
4. September 8, 1974, a full pardon was granted to Richard Nixon by President Ford.
   a. President Ford granted "... a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974."

b. The President also asked that Congress appropriate $850,000 ($400,000 more than specified on the Presidential Transition Act of 1963). This was in addition to the regular annual pension of $60,000.

c. Probable motives for President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon

1) The possibility that Mr. Jaworski was about to ask a grand jury to indict Mr. Nixon on criminal charges.

2) His sincere conviction that the pardon was "in the best interest of the nation" and that "...Richard Nixon and his loved ones have suffered enough...."

Suggested Activities and Questions for Further Study

. An impeachment inquiry is accepted loosely as closely resembling a grand jury investigation. To what extent is this true? How do both differ from a trial in a court of law?

. President Nixon and his Watergate lawyers insisted that the Constitution required, as grounds for impeachment, not only evidence of a criminal act, but one of a very serious nature committed in one's governmental capacity." According to this interpretation, why would impeachment be impossible for

1. The bombing of Cambodia

2. Mr. Nixon's questionable income tax deductions?

. Discuss the accuracy and the political wisdom of the following statements by Representative (now President) Ford, made in 1970 while arguing for the impeachment of Justice Douglas.

. "What then is an impeachable offense? The only honest answer is

that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history. Something less than a criminal act or criminal dereliction of duty may nevertheless be sufficient grounds for impeachment."

A Supreme Court ruling in 1946 upheld the conviction of a general for war crimes committed by his troops of which he had knowledge. The American Civil Liberties Union holds that this ruling applies to a president who, when put on notice of wrongdoing by his aides by means of newspaper articles and other publicity, chooses to close his eyes to their misconduct. Explain why you agree or disagree with this position of the A.C.L.U.

It is tempting to seek for parallels in the two presidential impeachments. The following have been adduced to show that "history repeats itself." Considering the similarities, explain why you believe these do or do not show the truth of the quotation.

Both Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon were loners, sensitive to their humble origins, ill at ease in Washington society, cool to the advice of Congressional leaders, bitter when the public failed to approve of them. Both were Republicans who succeeded to the Presidency despite unpopularity among the party's Eastern establishment. Both antagonized Congress: Johnson by opposing Congressional Reconstruction plans, Nixon by refusing to follow Congressional spending decisions. Both saw impeachment as a threat to crucial policies: Johnson's policy of post-Civil War conciliation and Nixon's policy of a "generation of peace." In both cases the immediate cause of the decision to consider impeachment was the dismissal by the President of an official whose continuation in office was desired by the Congress: Johnson's secretary of war, Edward Stanton, and Nixon's special prosecutor, Archibald Cox.

. Draw up a comparable list of differences between the two impeachment proceedings.

. In leading the pre-impeachment proceedings against Andrew Johnson, Thaddeus Stevens condemned in advance anyone who would dare to let "such a criminal escape." In leading the pre-impeachment proceedings against Richard Nixon, Peter Rodino said, "I... have been guided by a simple principle, the principle that the law must deal fairly with every man."

What do these two statements reveal about the atmosphere surrounding the two impeachment proceedings? Why then was Andrew Johnson able to continue in office despite the fact that his conviction at the Senate trial after House impeachment failed by only one vote, but Richard Nixon felt the need to resign before he was even impeached?

. Turn the clock back to the fall of 1973. A friend asks you to sign a petition calling for the impeachment of Richard Nixon. Why will you sign or refuse to sign?

. Why do many Americans deplore President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon?

. In each of the following, the first statement represents the position of Richard Nixon, the second that of the anti-Nixonites. Indicate in each case why you consider one or the other position the more reasonable.

. The Presidency will be hurt if an incumbent is impeached.

* The Presidency will be hurt if the office is occupied by someone whose own words, recorded on tape by himself, prove him to have violated his oath, the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the tradtional morality of the nation.

. Impeachment will hurt our foreign relations.

* Impeachment cannot hurt our foreign relations because foreign nations prefer less personalized relations; and because most foreign countries having governments based on ministerial responsibility, are accustomed to prompt resignation for offenses far less serious than those of which Richard Nixon was accused.

Theme III: Political Morality

Overview

How could Watergate have happened? Is it the result of flawed national morality? Is it inherent in our political system? Is it inevitable whenever, as in present-day America, the stakes are enormous wealth and power and the risks are relatively small? Does it symbolize weakening of the democratic process and of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights?

> "The basic problem posed by Watergate and all its attendant horrors, is neither constitutional nor political; it is moral. After all, we can never get away from the...fact (that) the American people re-elected Mr. Nixon by a majority of nearly 18 million votes. Either they did not know what kind of man he was, in which case they were inexcusably negligent or inexcusably naive, or they did know what kind of man he was and did not care or perhaps liked him as he was....
>
> Did he not represent qualities in the American character that are widespread and even taken for granted? In himself and in the curious collection of associates he gathered around him, he represents what is artificial, meretricious, and manipulative. He represents the American preference for the symbolic over the real, for advertising over the product, for public relations over character, for spectator sports over active games, and for spectator politics over participatory democracy."[1]

Granted that the question posed by Watergate is at least in part a moral one, what is the role of the schools in the development of values? Once it was a primary educational objective. In the recent past it has been deemphasized. For this relative neglect of education for moral values, many reasons have been suggested. "It borders on indoctrination." "It is the function of family and church, not of the school." "Ethical values cannot be taught; they may be caught from school people, but not taught by them." "If people disagree on the meaning of values, how can they be taught?" Whatever the reason, despite uninterrupted lip service to education for ethical goals, despite the inclusion of curriculum materials particularly

1. Henry Steele Commager, "Watergate and the Schools." To-Day's Education (September-October 1974), p. 22.

in English and social studies courses, there was really virtually no direct education for moral values and allegedly very little concomitant learning.

Recently, however, there has been renewed emphasis on education for values and valuing. This trend received considerable impetus from the Watergate affair because Watergate involved questions of personal values as well as political morality.

I. What were the political practices that made Watergate possible?

A. The procedure for nominating a president

1. Lack of constitutional and statutory provisions leaving political parties free to develop their own practices.
2. Circus-like qualities of many nominating conventions.
3. Tendency for newly nominated presidents to hand pick their vice-presidential nominees in order to "balance the ticket." Lack of previous experience or experience of doubtful morality is less important in the choice than expediency, e.g.,

a. Dwight D. Eisenhower kept Richard Nixon as the vice presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956 despite

1) The exposed demagoguery of Nixon's first campaign for the House of Representatives against Helen Gahagan Douglas.
2) Exposure of Nixon's secret slush fund in the 1952 campaign. (Did the Checquers speech presage the Watergate cover-up speeches?)

b. Richard Nixon's choice of Spiro Agnew as his running mate in 1968 and 1972.

B. Election campaigns

1. Enormous increase in cost in recent years.

The 1975 Federal Election Law provides for the following grants of federal funds to each major party candidate in 1976: for President, $20,000,000 for the general election and up to $10,000,000 for the primaries; for each Senatorial candidate, up to $150,000 for the general election, up to $100,000 for the primaries, and a fund-raising allowance; for each House candidate, up to $70,000 for the general elections, another $70,000 for primaries, and a fund-raising allowance. Contrast this with the British limit for the election of M.P. of $1,875 plus 25 cents for every six registered rural voters or for every eight urban voters.

2. Willingness of individuals and corporations to make large contributions, possibly for past or future favors, e.g.,

a. A partial list of ambassadors' contributions to Nixon's reelection.[1]

U.S. Ambassador to Finland	$ 30,000
U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad	$ 43,505
U.S. Ambassador to Austria	$100,000
U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland	$100,000
U.S. Ambassador to England	$254,000
U.S. Ambassador to Luxemburg	$300,000
U.S. Ambassador to France	$300,000

b. Contributions of Corporations. Of the acknowledged $60,000,000 raised by CREEP for the 1972 campaign, $5-6 million came from defense contractors. Over $10,000,000 came from oil interests. Other admitted corporate contributors include I.T.T. and the Associated Milk Producers, Inc.

3. The "slush fund," used in previous campaigns, was swollen to enormous proportions in the 1972 campaign.

a. Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo had at least $190,000 in cash from

1. Helen D. Wise, What Do We Tell the Children? (New York: George Braziller, Inc. 1972), pp. 84, 111.

Howard Hughes.

b. Distributions from the fund, at President Nixon's direction included:

1) $45,977 for improvements to his Florida home and $4,500 for diamonds for Mrs. Nixon.

2) Gifts or loans to Donald and Edward Nixon and Rose Mary Woods.

C. Attempts to reform the electoral process

1. 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act

2. 1966 Long Act, the first with income tax check-off, proved unpopular and was repealed.

3. 1971 tax check-off; amended in 1973 to divide money equally between two major parties.

4. 1972 Federal Election Campaign Act. When Nixon signed it, February 7, 1972, he said the law would "work to build public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process." It provides for full disclosure of all contributions over $10, and requires that complete records be kept available, that nothing be done in the candidate's name without his written authorization, and set a new limit on expenditure of personal funds. But the old law expired on March 10, 1972, and the new one became effective on April 9, 1972, leaving a month during which CREEP could operate outside the sanctions of any law. Many irregularities later exposed by Watergate inquires took place during this time.

5. In May, 1973, a Federal Electoral Reform Commission was established by Congress at Nixon's request. But in the fall of that year, when a reform bill was to be debated in Congress, Nixon provided a government airplane to bring key senators back to Washington to filibuster against campaign reform. The bill was not passed.

6. In January, 1975, a new electoral law became effective to prevent a repetition of the 1972 improprieties. It provides, among other things, for an independent enforcement agency.

II. What was the political climate that made Watergate possible?

A. Voter apathy[1]

1. The 1974 congressional election, hailed as a great democratic victory for young people, women, blacks and other minorities, environmentalists and consumer advocates, attracted only 38% of the eligible voters; in many cases election was by less than 20% of the eligibles.

2. Even in presidential elections, voter turnout lags behind other countries, including those which do not have compulsory voting. (The lag existseven after discounting for different methods of counting voter turnout.)

United States	1968 - 60% (of the eligibles) voted
United States	1972 - 55% (of the eligibles) voted
Japan	1972 - 72.3% (of those registered) voted
Germany	1972 - 91+% (of those registered) voted
France	1973 - 81% (of those registered) voted
Great Britain	1974 - 88% (of those registered) voted

1. Based on The New York Times (November 10, 1974).

3. Possible reasons

a. Diversity and mobility of Americans.

b. Restrictive registration requirements.

c. The belief that despite recent gains for minorities, we are still very far from the ideal of complete access to elected office regardless of race, religion, sex.

d. The feeling that "they're all corrupt anyway."

B. Acceptance of secrecy and lying as normal political practices

1. Establishment by Congress of the C.I.A. in 1947 created an intelligence operation abroad which, in effect, was authorized to practice secrecy and deceit in foreign relations.

a. The justification was that living in a hard, predatory cloak-and-dagger world requires that we deal with a potential totalitarian enemy by imitating him.

b. The result is that lying in foreign relations is easily extended to domestic affairs.

1) A member of the Kennedy administration even says, "The government has a right to lie."

2) Successive presidents lie to the American people about the U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Watergate; they justify the lies as not only necessary, but normal political procedure.

2. There is need to distinguish between:

a. Reasonable confidentiality to protect the process of problem-solving or the rights of individuals.

b. A cult of secrecy whose purpose is to prevent disclosure or protect unworthy decisions, one which may actually encourage

commission of the kind of acts about which our government feels it necessary to lie.

C. New Interpretations of political leadership and loyalty

1. Recent tendency to equate leadership with toughness, slickness, craftiness, and pragmatism in place of honesty, integrity, compassion, and cooperation.

2. Loyalty has come to be synonymous with following orders; dissent with disloyalty. Loyalty is often misdirected to a person rather than to an institution or ideal, e.g., "I would walk over my grandmother if necessary to accomplish the Administration's objectives."

3. The Nixon men knew that what they were doing was illegal or immoral, but they did it because those above them wanted it; to question it would have been disloyal.

III. What was the moral climate that made Watergate possible?

A. Cynicism

1. "Everybody does it." President Nixon, April 30, 1974, "....both of our great parties have been guilty of such tactics."

2. "Everybody cheats on his income tax."

3. Some Americans, interviewed after Agnew's resignation, indicated they thought Agnew had done nothing unusual.

4. "It's no big deal."

a. Lieutenant Calley defended his action at My Lai, said he was only following orders.

b. Mr. Nixon 9/22/73. "It's water under the bridge."

c. Harry S. Dent, special counsel to Nixon, convicted of participation in illegally raising and using a 3-million dollar campaign fund, joked about the charge, comparing it to a speeding ticket.

B. Gamesmanship - The recent and growing tendency to see the political process as a game: football, poker, charades, any game with winners and losers.

1. Like the good team player who discarded individual judgment there are those who think the true patriot is one who conforms and is part of the silent majority.

2. The players were obsessed by the need to win. They recognized no legal or moral limits on the means that could be used to further the work of CREEP.

C. "The end justifies the means." Two ends were paramount:

1. The reelection of the President was considered important enough to justify illegal burglary and bugging of Democratic Party Headquarters, violations of the Federal Election Law of 1972, forging of documents, and the elaborate cover-up.

2. National Security

a. An obsession with enemies pervaded the White House: students, blacks, the press, liberals, hippies, disloyal senators, peace advocates.

b. In the name of national security, President Nixon's aides ordered wiretapping, compilation of enemies lists, falsification of records, and the activities of the "plumbers."

c. Violation of civil rights and electronic surveillance dated from earlier times (Amerasia), but went to new lengths under Nixon.

1) The Houston Plan, 1970, proposed to coordinate and centralize the surveillance activities of the various Federal investigative agencies. Illegal actions were authorized by the

President including electronic surveillance, break-ins, interception, and reading of private mail. The Houston Plan was abandoned, but the activities of the White House "plumbers" indicate that only the centralized co-ordination was abandoned; the violations of civil rights continued.

2) Nixon, his aides, and one of their attorneys, John J. Wilson, argued that the President had the inherent power to protect the nation against foreign spies by all methods, including the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office.

3) The administration forgot or disregarded the idea that even if there were danger, the phrase "national security" is not a magic formula to dissolve the guarantees and restraints of the Constitution.

IV. What is the role of the schools in promoting moral values?

A. Definitions (as used in this section)[1]

1. Values are criteria for determining levels of goodness, worth, or beauty which guide the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people e.g., honesty, freedom, privacy, rationality.

2. Valuing is the process of developing or actualizing values.

B. Some things the schools cannot or should not do:

1. Indoctrinate specific values

2. Teach moral values as copybook maxims.

3. Teach values which the school people do not practice.

4. Teach values which the society does not practice.[2]

1. Douglas Superka, "Approaches to Values Education." Social Science Educational Consortium Newsletter (Number 20, November, 1974).

2. Henry Steele Commager, Op. Cit., pp. 22-23.

a. American society says it wants the schools to teach children to favor life, liberty, and happiness for all, racial equality, respect for the law, reverence for peace, the universal application of the Bill of Rights, service to the community above service to self, the rewards of the mind and the spirit above those of the market place or polling place. But society often practices the antithesis of each of these.

C. Some things the schools can and should do:

1. Set an example of moral, humane, cooperative, democratic behavior.
2. Heighten pupil awareness of their own moral values. When students list the things they prize, indicate what makes them happy or sad, tell how they know what is right, ponder whether people will always believe this or that, discuss becoming conscious of their own values. With emphasis on the process, not the outcome, the teacher helps expose the values of pupils for their own analysis.
3. Require pupils to listen in the sense that Carl Rogers uses the term. Not only hear the words but listen to the feelings behind the words; empathize with the speaker; suspend one's own value judgments so as to understand those of the speaker.
4. Generate alternatives for pupils. Because there is no true value unless freely chosen, there must be alternatives. Pupils must understand the nature of the alternatives, the consequences of each, the criteria for choosing. This is especially difficult with students who choose a socially disruptive alternative.

5. Create opportunities for pupils to go beyond value clarification.
   a. Reject the notion that because values are personal, one person's values are just as good as the next fellow's
   b. Emphasize that not all values are relative; some are culturally universal, e.g., John Dewey's concept of active thought about and concern for social justice.
   c. Avoid emphasis on the content of thinking or the specific value content; that is indoctrination.
   d. Concentrate on the process of thinking, of stimulating new ways of judging and valuing.
6. Study the findings of recent research in values, education, especially:
   a. The stage concept or development theories of Lawrence Kohlberg and Jane Lovinger.
   b. The classification of approaches of Douglas Superka.

V. Conclusions about values, education, and Watergate
   A. The meretricious values of the Nixon group can be exposed without indoctrination. According to the men involved in the scandal,
      1. A worthy thing is worthless if it won't sell, and a worthless thing is worthy if it will sell.
      2. Words and images are more important than facts and deeds.
      3. Two (or more) wrongs can make a right. Thus secret wiretaps, lists of enemies, special investigations by the Internal Revenue Service were justified because prior administrations had done the same.
   B. Although there is some evidence that new ways of thinking may reveal new possibilities for action, it must be admitted that we are not

really certain that moral judgment necessarily leads to moral action. Pupils who study, understand, and condemn the illegal and immoral Watergate activities will not necessarily be more legal and moral in their own personal and public lives. But they will at least have the basis for making reasoned decisions based on their own ethical systems.

C. It is worth discussing the moral values of young adults. They along with a multifarious population marched in Selma, joined Nader's Raiders and sat in at the Pentagon. They went to prison and into exile out of a sense of moral outrage and ethical refusal to participate in what they considered to be an illegal and immoral war.

Suggested Activities and Questions for Further Study

. Label and caption Nast's famous cartoon of the Tweed Ring to apply to Watergate.

. Ask for a limited number of student volunteers to do action research for extra credit. Have pupils sign up without giving precise details of the project except to suggest vaguely that it might involve photographing or recording on tape the reaction of fellow students to situations like finding a ring in the washroom. Do they leave it, pocket it, turn it in? Encourage private discussion, after a few days, of any qualms the volunteers may have about the appropriateness of the assignment or of their own actions. Did it occur to any of them that the teacher might give an assignment that was not legitimate? Did pupils sense a conflict between wanting to please the teacher, and their own moral values? Did they see the relevance to Watergate?[1]

. Under what circumstances would you lie?

. Under what circumstances would you disobey an order?

. "If Watergate had happened in Great Britain or in any parliamentary country, there would not have been two long years of investigation, dissimulation, national upheaval, etc. Mr. Nixon and his aides would have resigned immediately and the country returned to normalcy." Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.

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1. Lisa Kuhmerker, "Can We Immunize Students Against Future Watergate?" Social Education (January, 1974), pp. 30-33. Two projects are described in detail; a source for others is listed.

. Discuss the implications of the following; examine your reaction to each statement:

The characters in the Watergate drama all believed themselves to be moral heroes. They were completely devoid of any sense of guilt

"The country I have served for my entire life and which directed me to carry out the Watergate entry is punishing me for doing the very thing it trained me to do." (A witness at the Ervin Committee hearings)

"Watergate was not just a burglary or a cover-up. It was an attitude: the attitude that law is made to serve power." (Anthony Lewis, The New York Times)

Watergate is worse than previous scandals because in earlier ones like the Credit Mobilier, Tweed Ring, Teapot Dome, outsiders tried to corrupt government with money or valuable gifts; in Watergate it was a conspiracy by insiders to crush political opponents and keep themselves in power.

. Barbara Tuchman says the greatest danger revealed by Watergate is "the habit of acquiescence." Show how this does or does not apply to you and your friends.

. Andrew Hacker in Time (8/19/74) says, "...beneath the surface there is a bit of Watergate in all of us..." Show the extent to which this accurately describes the people you know.

Secondly, with Watergate as with other national events, most American people want to think well of their leaders and are ready to forgive mistakes, even legal transgressions. What many cannot tolerate is lying and lack of contrition. To most American people the cover-up was worse than the break-in. Few of the major defendants, certainly not Richard Nixon, ever admitted to having done anything intentionally self-seeking or illegal. They spoke of "mistakes and misjudgments" and claimed as their justification "the best interests of the nation."

It is also clear that most Americans will not indefinitely tolerate abuse of power and violation of their legal rights. The present CIA probe indicates a desire to prevent another Watergate, to keep the "cancer growing around the Presidency" from spreading to other parts of the body politic. Even now, before the last defendants have been sentenced, most Americans are experiencing a kind of national catharsis, a feeling that honor, integrity, and constitutional guarantees have been upheld.

Still another positive outcome of Watergate is the realization that new legislation and new policies are necessary if future Watergates are to be prevented. Campaign costs must be strictly limited, and borne mostly by government. Presidential war-making powers and control of foreign relations by executive agreements must be curbed and the powers returned to the Congress. The myth of Executive privilege, Executive immunity, and Executive secrecy, virtually unknown until this generation, should be ended; the only exception tolerable is for secrecy

in case of genuine emergency during war times. It has also been suggested that we need constitutional amendments for a sistuation in which neither president nor vice president was elected to that position, and to abandon presidential government in favor of a responsible ministerial type. With respect to the latter suggestion, in the words of Earl Warren, "We need not tear down the house because we didn't like the last tenant."

Despite the natural desire for legislative remedies to prevent future Watergates, many Americans realize that new laws, however necessary, are not sufficient. Of equal importance is that in the schools, as well as in the political arena, new attitudes and behavior prevail. While the schools alone cannot mold the mind, they can go far to show the positive good of questioning authority, or rejecting blind acceptance, of living democratically. They can emphasize critical analysis of all the data. The schools can practice mutual respect for pupils and teachers. They can temper uncontrolled competition for rewards, competition which by creating extreme pressure for winning, may lead to unethical acts. The schools can, in short, live morally and democratically.

The country has survived civil war, riots, assassination, unpopular wars; it will survive Watergate. What is needed is that in place of despair or skepticism, we exercise intelligence, watchfulness, and courage.

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SOUND FILMSTRIPS

Government on Trial: From Watergate to Where?

Current Affairs Films

24 Danbury Road

Wilton, Conn. 06897

Participants in the "Watergate" Affair

Barker, Bernard	Convicted Watergate burglar. Released pending appeal after serving 1 year of a 2½-to 6-year sentence.
Bernstein, Carl	Reporter for The Washington Post who uncovered and reported much of the Watergate story.
Buchanan, Patrick J.	Special consultant to President Nixon.
Butterfield, Alexander P.	Former presidential appointments secretary who accidentally revealed the existence of the tapes.
Buzhardt, J. Fred, Jr.	Special counsel to the President.
Byrne, W. Matthew, Jr.	Presiding judge at the Ellsberg-Russo trial.
Caddy, C. Douglas	Original attorney for the 5 men caught at the Watergate.
Chapin, Dwight L.	Appointments secretary to President Nixon. Convicted of perjury to grand jury about "dirty tricks."
Colby, William E.	CIA director since Sept. 1973.
Colson, Charles W.	Former special counsel to the President. Released from 1-3-year prison term on 2/1/75 by Judge Sirica because of family hardship.
Cox, Archibald	Special Watergate prosecutor, dismissed in the Saturday night purge.
Dahlberg, Kenneth H.	Former treasurer of the finance committee of CREEP.
Dash, Samuel	Counsel to the Ervin committee
Dean, John W.	Former counsel to President Nixon; later a principal prosecution witness. Pleaded guilty to Watergate cover-up. Sentenced to 1-4 years.
De Diego, Felipe	Convicted of the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office.

Dent, Harry S.	Special counsel to President Nixon. Pleaded guilty to participation in an illegally organized political committee in 1970. Sentenced to one month's probation.
Ehrlichman, John D.	Former chief domestic affairs advisor to President Nixon. Found guilty in the cover-up trial.
Ellsberg, Dr., Daniel J.	Defendant in the Pentagon Papers case.
Ervin, Senator Sam J. Jr.	North Carolina Democrat, chariman of the Senate Select Committee on Watergate.
Fielding, Dr. Lewis	Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist whose office was burglarized by the "plumbers."
Flanigan, Peter M.	Assistant to the President for international affairs.
Gagliardi, Lee P.	U. S. District Court judge presiding at the Mitchell-Stans trial.
Gesell, Gerhard A.	U. S. District Court judge, Washington, D. C.
Gonzales, Virgilio R.	Convicted Watergate burglar. Released on parole after serving 4 months of a 1-4-year sentence.
Gray, L. Patrick 3rd	Former acting director of the F.B.I.
Haldeman, H. R.	Former White House chief of staff (succeeded by General Alexander M. Haig); convicted in the cover-up trial.
Hearing, George A.	Florida accountant who helped Segretti in his "dirty tricks." Pleaded guilty. Released after serving 7 months of a one-year sentence.
Helms, Richard M.	Former director of the CIA who allegedly directed the surveillance of American citizen activists.
Hunt, E. Howard Jr.	Former CIA agent, White House consultant, "plumber," convicted Watergate conspirator in the first trial. His wife Dorothy, allegedly a conduit for hush money, was killed in a plane crash December 8, 1972. Sentenced to $2\frac{1}{2}$-8 years; released pending appeal.
Jaworski, Leon	Seccessor to Cox as Watergate special prosecutor.

Kalmbach, Herbert W.	Personal attorney to President Nixon. Confessed to raising hush money and to offering to sell an ambassadorship. Sentenced to 6-18 months.
Kleindienst, Richard G.	Former U. S. attorney general, successor to Mitchell. Pleaded guilty to false swearing and pressure on him by Nixon to soften antitrust suit against ITT. Received a one-month suspended sentence.
Krogh, Egil, Jr.	Former chief assistant to John D. Erlichman; chief "plumber" convicted in the Fielding burglary. Completed a 6-month sentence.
La Rue, Frederick C.	CREEP aide. Pleaded guilty to conspiracy in cover-up.
Liddy, G. Gordon	Former White House aide, "plumber," convicted in the first Watergate case and the Fielding burglary. Sentenced up to 20 years and 1-3 years respectively to be served concurrently. Released after 21 months pending appeal.
Magruder, Jeb Stuart	Deputy director of CREEP. Pleaded guilty to Watergate cover-up. Sentenced to 10 months-4 years.
Mardian, Robert	Former assistant attorney general; CREEP official. Convicted in cover-up trial.
Martinez, Egenio R.	Convicted Watergate burglar. Released on parole after serving 4 months of a 1-4 year sentence. Pleaded guilty of Fielding burglary. Sentenced to 3 years' probation.
Mc Cord, James W., Jr.	Convicted Watergate burglar. Sentenced to 1-5 years; free on bond, pending appeal.
Mitchell, John N.	Former U. S. attorney general; former director of CREEP; convicted in cover-up trial.
Morgan, Edward L.	Assistant Treasury secretary. Pleaded guilty to illegally back dating Nixon's gift of vice presidential papers. Received sentence of 4 months in prison and 20 months probation.
Neal, James F.	Chief prosecutor at the cover-up trial.
Parkinson, Kenneth W.	Washington lawyer retained by CREEP to handle litigation stemming from Watergate. The only defendant in the cover-up trial found not guilty.
Peterson, Henry E.	Assistant attorney general; headed Justice Department's Watergate inquiry.

Porter, Herbert L.	CREEP official, pleaded guilty of lying to FBI about Watergate cover-up. Released after serving 30 days of a 5-15-month sentence.
Reinache, Ed	Lieutenant governor of California. Convicted of lying during Kleindienst confirmation hearings about an offer to Mitchell from ITT. Received 18-month suspended sentence.
Richardson, Elliot L.	Former U. S. attorney general, successor to Kleindienst.
Rodino, Peter W., Jr.	New Jersey Democrat, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee which voted to impeach President Nixon.
Ruckelshaus, William	Former deputy attorney general; dismissed with Cox and Richardson in the Saturday night massacre of 1973.
Saxbe, William B.	Successor to Richardson as attorney general. Ambassador to India.
Schlesinger, James R.	Director of CIA 1973, after Helms and before Colby. Disclosed illegal CIA activities beginning in the 1950's, now secretary of defense.
Segretti, Donald H.	Former Treasure Department attorney; convicted of political espionage and sabotage against the Democrats. Released after serving 5 months of a 6-month sentence.
Sirica, John J.	Former chief judge, U. S. District Court, Washington, D.C.
Stans, Maurice H.	Former secretary of commerce; former chairman of the finance committee of CREEP.
St. Clair, James D.	Special counsel to the President.
Sturgis, Frank A.	Convicted of Watergate burglary. Released pending appeal after serving one year of a 1-4-year prison sentence.
Vesco, Robert L.	New York financier; secretly donated $200,000 to CREEP while under investigation by the S.E.C. for securities fraud. Indicted with Mitchell and Stans.
Woods, Rose Mary	Executive assistant and personal secretary to President Nixon.
Woodward, Bob	Reporter for The Washington Post who, with Bernstein, exposed the Watergate story.
Young, David R., Jr.	Former White House aide; a "plumber."
Ziegler, Ronald L.	White House press secretary.

1969 JUNE 13. Nixon is advised by Mitchell that despite the 4th amendment, presidential powers permit wiretapping (without court order) of any domestic group which seeks unlawfully to attack or subvert the U.S. government.

1970 JUNE 5. Nixon sets up an interagency domestic intelligence operation headed by J. Edgar Hoover.

JUNE 25. The Interagency Committee recommends the Houston Plan authorizing surreptitious entry, covert mail coverage, etc. Despite the protest of Hoover, Nixon approves the plan. Nixon claims later that he withdrew his authorization; committee members deny that Nixon ever rescinded the Huston Plan.

1971 JUNE 13. The New York Times begins publication of the Pentagon Papers released by Daniel Ellsberg. Nixon appoints a group (headed by Krogh, including Liddy and Hunt, and supervised by Ehrlichman) to stop security leaks and investigate other sensitive security matters. The group comes to be known as the Plumbers.

JUNE 28. Ellsberg is indicted.

JULY 20 and 26. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, refuses to discuss his patient with FBI agents.

AUG. 11. Ehrlichman approves a covert operation proposed by Krogh and Hunt to obtain Dr. Fielding's files.

SEPT. 3-4. Hunt, Liddy, DeDiego, Martinez, and Barker break into Fielding's office. DeDiego says he filmed the files; Barker denies it.

SEPT. 23. At Colson's suggestion, Hunt begins to alter the files dealing with the escalation of the Viet Nam war; specifically, he splices false diplomatic cables to implicate officials of the Kennedy administration in the Diem assassination.

1972 JAN. 27. Liddy details to Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean his million-dollar plan to hurt the Democrats by "dirty tricks" such as mugging squads, kidnapping, fake letters, etc.; he is told to return with a more realistic plan.

FEB. 4. Liddy complies with a half-million dollar plan for wiretapping and photography. Magruder says the Watergate and other targets were approved by Mitchell at this time.

MAR. 1. Mitchell becomes director of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP).

APR. 3. Gulf Resources Chemical Corp. of Houston contributes $100,000 to CREEP in violation of federal laws prohibiting contributions by corporations. To conceal the contribution, the money is "laundered" in Mexico, i.e., Gulf Resources transfers the money to a Mexican subsidiary which gives a $100,000 "legal fee" to Ogarrio, Gulf's attorney in Mexico City. Ogarrio converts this into 4 checks totalling $89,000 drawn on his Mexico City bank, payable to himself. A courier delivers the 4 checks and $11,000 in cash to a Texas fund-raising group. Similar laundered contributions are arranged involving Dahlberg and Stans.

APR. 7. New federal election law becomes effective requiring full disclosure of all campaign contributions.

APR. 9. Dahlberg completes pick-up of the $25,000 contributions arranged before Apr. 7 and later claims disclosure was not required because it was arranged before the new law was in effect.

APR. 10. Vesco, under SEC investigation for alleged 224 million dollar mutual fund swindle, gives Stans a $200,000 campaign contribution.

APR. 12 - MAY 27. Intensive preparations and 2 unsuccessful attempts to break into Democratic National Committee headquarters.

MAY 2. J. Edgar Hoover dies.

MAY 28. Successful break-in; wiretaps planted on telephones; documents photographed.

JUNE 8. Liddy gives Magruder the "Gemstone" transcripts of wiretapped Democratic National Committee conversations and photographs of DNC documents taken on 5/28.

JUNE 9. According to Magruder, Gemstone is shown to Mitchell who then asks for better information; denied by Mitchell.

JUNE 17. Second break-in at DNC headquarters at the Watergate is interrupted at 2:30 a.m. when an alert security guard, Frank Wills, calls the police. Police arrest Barker, Martinez, Sturgis, Gonzales, and McCord at the Watergate; later Liddy and Hunt confiscate electronic surveillance equipment, lock picks, tear gas guns, and a bundle of consecutively numbered hundred dollar bills. Liddy reports the arrest to Magruder (in California); Magruder tells Mitchell, and says that Mitchell told him to have Liddy contact Kleindienst about release of the men. Kleindienst refuses. Liddy goes to CREEP headquarters and shreds some files.

JUNE 18. Mitchell issues a statement that the Watergate burglars were not working for, or with the consent of, CREEP.

JUNE 19. Hunt's name and White House phone number found in address books of Barker and Martinez are interpreted as linking the White House to the break-in. Ziegler refuses to comment on a "third-rate burglary attempt." The Justice Department announces it has begun a "full investigation" of the Watergate break-in. Liddy briefs Ehrlichman who tells Dean to instruct Hunt to leave the country. The Supreme Court rejects Mitchell's June 1969 wiretap doctrine. Haldeman allegedly orders the files to be cleaned up. Dean says he expressed fears to Kleindienst and Peterson that Watergate might lead to the White House. Gray refuses to give Haldeman and Kleindienst the FBI summary report of the Watergate investigation.

JUNE 20. The DNC enters a one-million dollar (later raised to $3.2 million) civil court case against CREEP, charging invasion of privacy and violation of the civil rights of Democrats. Mitchell apologizes to Nixon for his ineffective control of CREEP. Dean receives forged diplomatic files and cables on the Pentagon Papers from Hunt's safe. He is told by Ehrlichman to shred them and to bury the electronic equipment. Hunt gets $15,200 from Haldeman's office to put in his own safe.

JUNE 21. Mitchell says his investigation of the Watergate break-in shows no connection to CREEP or the White House.

JUNE 22. In an impromptu news conference (the first in 3 months) Nixon denies White House involvement in the break-in.

JUNE 23. At Nixon's request, Haldeman and Ehrlichman ask Gray to keep the FBI investigation away from CIA-related matters in Mexico.

JUNE 28. According to Dean, he and others meet in Mitchell's office to discuss the need for money to buy the silence of the men in jail for the Watergate break-in. Stenographic notebooks containing Liddy's dictation are shredded.

JUNE 29. Kalmbach begins secret collection of about $500,000 which ends up in the hands of the Watergate defendants and their lawyers.

JUNE 30. Ziegler says there is no White House involvement in the Watergate incident.

JULY 12. Gray says he is prepared to resign over apparent White House attempt to implicate the FBI and the CIA in a cover-up.

JULY 21. Gray's report to Dean indicates that CREEP officials tried to impede the FBI investigation. Later, he sends Dean the official FBI interview reports of the Watergate break-in investigation.

AUG. 1. The Washington Post reveals that a $25,000 check to CREEP was deposited in Barker's bank account; a week later the paper prints Stans' denial that a campaign contribution helped to finance the Watergate break-in.

AUG. 8. According to Kleindienst, Ehrlichman called him to complain that Petersen was harassing Stans. Kleindienst warns Ehrlichman that this might be construed as obstruction of justice.

AUG. 10. Liddy is named as the man who gave Barker $25,000, the first public admission that campaign contributions were involved in the Watergate break-in.

AUG. 11. Judge Richey denies CREEP request to postpone the DNC civil suit until after the election.

AUG. 19. Rep. Patman, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee orders investigation of the Watergate break-in and laundered money; later he threatens subpoenas to obtain overdue report on campaign financing from the General Accounting Office (GAO).

AUG. 26. GAO reports 11 apparent violations by CREEP of the new Federal Election Campaigns Act.

AUG. 28. Kleindienst promises a thorough investigation by the Justice Department of the break-in and related events.

AUG. 29. The very next day, Nixon announces at a news conference that the Justice Department investigation absolves the White House.

AUG. 30. Stans tells the Patman Committee he knew nothing about Mexican funds laundering.

SEPT. 8. Ziegler says Dean's report on his Watergate investigation will not be released to the press.

SEPT. 9. Justice Department investigation of Watergate exonerates the White House and CREEP.

SEPT. 12. Barker admits his role in the break-in; refuses to implicate others; pleads guilty on Sept. 15.

SEPT. 15. Federal grand jury indicts the 5 men arrested at Watergate plus Liddy and Hunt. Justice Department promptly announces an end to its investigation saying no others were involved. Dean says that on this day he first spoke to Nixon about Watergate and in Haldeman's presence, Nixon said he was pleased it had stopped at Liddy. Dean says he warned Nixon he might not be able to contain the case.

SEPT. 16. Kleindienst and Petersen deny a whitewash.

SEPT. 20 Agnew says the Watergate defendants were hired to embarrass the Republican Party.

SEPT. 21. Judge Richey stays the DNC civil suit against CREEP until the Watergate criminal trial is over.

OCT. 3. At the request of Petersen, the Patman Committee agrees to postpone hearings until after the election.

OCT. 10. The Washington Post calls the Watergate break-in part of a massive campaign of sabotage directed by the White House and CREEP and financed by a secret fund controlled by Mitchell and others. Ziegler severely criticizes the article. Patman resumes committee hearings and asks Dean, Mitchell, and Stans to appear; they refuse, claiming executive privilege.

OCT. 12. Senators Kennedy, Jackson, and others call for a Senate probe of Watergate.

OCT. 17. Judge Sirica sets Nov. 15 for start of the criminal trial of Watergate defendants, despite requests for postponement.

OCT. 18. Ziegler denies White House involvement.

OCT. 27. Judge Sirica postpones Watergate trial until Jan. 8, 1973.

NOV. 7. Nixon and Agnew are reelected.

NOV. 30. According to McCord, Dorothy Hunt told the defendants there would be no more money unless they pleaded guilty and gave no testimony; she also said her husband had information which could cause Nixon to be impeached.

DEC. 8. Dorothy Hunt is killed in a plane crash. Her purse, containing $10,000 in $100 bills, is recovered. Judge Byrne declares a mistrial on the Pentagon Papers case.

DEC. 12. White House confirms the existence of the "plumbers" but denies that Liddy and Hunt were members.

DEC. 21. According to McCord, his attorney suggested the CIA would cooperate if he claimed the break-in was a CIA operation; he refused.

1973 JAN. 3. According to Dean, Hunt asked for more money and executive clemency. Hunt denies the latter and claims the $156,000 he got was for legal fees, not silence.

JAN. 4-5. According to Dean he discussed promise of clemency with Ehrlichman and with Nixon; they deny it.

JAN. 8. The Watergate break-in criminal trial begins.

JAN. 8, 10. Anonymous phone calls promise funds and employment to McCord; plea bargaining by McCord and Hunt. Hunt pleads guilty to lesser charges.

JAN. 11. Senator Sam J. Ervin agrees to head a Senate committee to investigate Watergate. Hunt denies knowledge of involvement of higher-ups. Petersen tells Patman that laundering money violated no federal laws.

JAN. 13. The New York Times reveals that at least four of the five Watergate defendants were still being paid by unknown persons and that CREEP cannot account for $900,000 in cash contributions.

JAN. 15. Four other Watergate defendants plead guilty to all 7 counts. They deny coercion or payment for silence.

JAN. 17. McCord claims he acted under duress, breaking the law to prevent the greater harm of probable violence against the President; Judge Sirica rejects this as ridiculous.

JAN. 18. Second Pentagon Papers trial begins in Los Angeles. Answering mounting criticism, Kleindienst says the White House has not interfered in Watergate investigations by the Justice Department and no special prosecutor is needed.

JAN. 19. According to Kalmbach, Mitchell and Dean asked him to raise more hush money; he refused.

JAN. 25. McCord says he refused another offer of executive clemency and is told he is "fouling up the game plan."

JAN. 30. The Watergate jury, after a 16-day trial hearing 62 witnesses, deliberates 90 minutes and finds Liddy guilty on six counts and McCord on all eight. They are immediately jailed pending decision on bond before sentencing.

FEB. 2. Judge Sirica says he is not satisfied that the full story came out at the trial. Rep. Patman suggests the resignation of Kleindienst for ineffective prosecution of the case.

FEB. 7. The Sentate establishes, by vote of 70-0, a Select Committee of 4 Democrats and 3 Republicans to investigate Watergate. Ervin becomes chairman on 2/21. On the same day The New York Times reports that the White House knew about the Liddy-Hunt intelligence operation as early as February, 1972. Ziegler denies this.

FEB. 10-11. Dean, Ehrlichman, Haldeman meet at a resort near San Clemente to plan Ervin committee strategy. According to Dean, they would pretend to cooperate while really impede the investigation.

FEB. 27-28. According to Dean he again warns Nixon that he might not be able to "contain" the investigation much longer. Nixon asks Dean to report to him directly. Dean admits his own involvement in cover-up and Nixon tells him not to worry.

FEB. 28. The DNC amends its civil suit again, raising the amount of damages and adding to the list of defendants the names Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Colson, Kalmbach, Segretti, et al. Senate hearings on confirmation of Gray as permanent FBI head begin. Gray admits showing Dean the FBI files on Watergate and offers to show them to any senator. Soon after, Nixon is alleged to have withdrawn his support of Gray and to have invoked executive privilege against Gray showing files to senators.

MAR. 14. Dean, volunteering to test executive privilege, declines to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee but agrees to answer written questions relating directly to the Gray nomination.

MAR. 16. Hunt leaves at the White House the last of at least 5 messages requesting more money. The administration rescinds Gray's offer to show FBI Watergate files to all senators, limiting the number to committee chairman, vice-chairman, and counsel.

MAR. 17. According to Nixon's statement of 8/15/73 this is when he first heard of the burglary of Dr. Felding's office.

MAR. 18. Ervin says White House aides claiming executive privilege to keep from testifying should be held in contempt of Congress.

MAR. 19. McCord writes to Sirica saying he and the other Watergate break-in defendants were under political pressure to plead guilty and remain silent, that perjury was committed at the trial, and that higher-ups were involved in the break-in.

MAR. 20. Gray tells the Senate Judiciary Committee he was instructed by Kleindienst to give the Senate no information regarding the FBI Watergate investigation. Nixon tells Senator Scott no one in the White House was involved in Watergate. Scott so reports to newsmen; later says tapes revealed that Nixon had lied.

MAR. 21. Nixon, Dean, Haldeman meet and agree to pay Hunt $75,000. Later in several speeches, Nixon says this is the day he received further information about Watergate and immediately ordered additional investigations to be made. Gray, Petersen, and Kleindienst deny receiving such directives. According to Dean, this is the day he told the President that Mitchell, Haldeman, Kalmbach, and Magruder were all involved in the cover-up.

MAR. 22. McCord is told the Administration will provide $100,000 cash for his bail.

MAR. 23. Judge Sirica discloses the contents of the McCord letter of 3/19; postpones sentencing. Five Watergate conspirators receive provisional maximum sentences (Hunt-35 years; Liddy-6 years, 8 mos. to 20 years; others -40 years). They are urged to cooperate with the grand jury and the Senate committee. According to Dean, Nixon calls him to Camp David and asks him to write a report of everything he knows about Watergate.

MAR. 26. The Los Angeles Times reports the McCord allegation that Dean and Magruder had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in, and that it was Hunt who offered him executive clemency. The Federal Grand Jury reconvenes to hear new Watergate charges.

MAR. 27. Hunt denies to grand jury knowledge by higher-ups; invokes the 5th Amendment. He is granted immunity by Sirica.

MAR. 28. McCord testifies before the Ervin Committee that Mitchell had prior knowledge of the Watergate plot. Mitchell calls it slanderous.

MAR. 29. The White House reiterates that no one on its staff was involved in or had knowledge of the break-in.

MAR. 30. Nixon asks Ehrlichman to conduct an independent inquiry. The White House offers Ervin a compromise on executive privilege agreeing to have the White House staff testify in closed sessions of the committee or the grand jury. Sirica gives Liddy immunity before the grand jury; postpones McCord's sentencing until June to allow him to testify further.

MAR. 31. Ziegler says White House staff will testify before grand jury if requested.

APR. 2-3. Ervin rejects as "poppycock" the White House offer of 3/30, saying "they are not nobility and royalty." Sirica sentences Liddy to 8-18 months for contempt for refusing to answer grand jury questions despite immunity.

APR. 5. In San Clemente, Ehrlichman discusses with Byrne (then presiding as judge in the second Ellsberg trial) an offer of appointment as FBI director; Gray's nomination is withdrawn. On April 7, Byrne rejects the offer.

APR. 9. McCord tells the grand jury Dorothy Hunt was a conduit for getting cash to Watergate defendants in return for their silence. Dean says he discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman a plan to place the blame for Watergate on Mitchell.

APR. 12. Magruder confesses perjury to U.S. attorneys.

APR. 14. According to Ehrlichman, Nixon receives his first full report on Watergate (from Ehrlichman); it implicates Mitchell, Dean, and Magruder.

APR. 17. Ziegler says all previous White House statements on Watergate are "inoperative." Tapes later played at the cover-up trial reveal that Nixon offered Haldeman and Ehrlichman $200,000 to $300,000 from funds held available by Rebozo, saying the money "doesn't come outta me." His aides reject Nixon's offer of cash in language held by the prosecution to show that all three understood they were protecting each other.

APR. 18. Petersen tells Nixon that though the prosecution in the second Ellsberg trial knew about the Fielding burglary, the judge still knew nothing about it. Nixon tells Petersen to say nothing to Judge Byrne because it's a national security matter.

APR. 19. Kleindienst disqualifies himself from the Watergate investigation because of his close association with many who are linked to Watergate.

APR. 20. McCord files a one and a half-million-dollar suit against CREEP, Magruder, Liddy, and Hunt for "entrapping" him.

APR. 23-24. The White House again denies prior knowledge of the break-in and denies involvement of key aides. Denies offering executive clemency to Watergate defendants in exchange for silence and guilty pleas.

APR. 25. On Petersen's threat to resign, Nixon rescinds his order to say nothing to Judge Byrne about the Fielding break-in.

APR. 26. Magruder resigns as assistant secretary of commerce, the first high Nixon aide to resign.

APR. 27. Gray resigns as acting FBI director. Ehrlichman and Haldeman take indefinite leaves of absence.

APR. 29. Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Kleindienst resign. Richardson replaces Kleindienst.

APR. 30. Nixon on television accepts responsibility for Watergate but denies personal involvement in the break-in or cover-up. He concedes for the first time that there had been an effort to conceal the facts and that he had therefore ordered a new probe on 3/21.

MAY 1. Ziegler apologizes to The Washington Post and reporters Woodward and Bernstein for his criticism of their Watergate articles. Resolutions in House and Senate urge appointment of a special prosecutor.

MAY 4. Dean discloses he removed Watergate-related documents from the White House to prevent their destruction.

MAY 6, 8. Ervin says he will call Nixon if necessary because he is not "exempt from the duties which devolve on other citizens." Nixon says executive privilege will be held to a minimum.

MAY 9. Senate hearings on confirmation of Richardson as attorney-general begin. Krogh resigns as under secretary of transportation claiming full responsibility for the Fielding burglary.

MAY 10. Mitchell and Stans are indicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice and for perjury regarding Vesco's $200,000 contribution to CREEP.

MAY 11. Pentagon Papers case dismissed for government misconduct.

MAY 16. Nixon asks Congress for legislation to reform election procedures.

MAY 17. Televised Senate Watergate hearings begin.

MAY 18. Cox is named special prosecutor. Says his main task will be to "restore confidence in the honor, integrity, and decency of government." Richardson says Cox is to have the greatest independence; 3 days later says, if necessary, he will follow the Watergate investigation into the White House.

MAY 19. GAO reveals Kalmbach's admission that he raised $230,00 for Watergate defendants.

MAY 22. Nixon again denies prior knowledge of break-in or cover-up, but admits ordering some aides to restrict the probe on grounds of national security, especially of possible CIA involvement.

MAY 24-25. In remarks to returning POWs Nixon defends government secrecy as vital to national security and condemns "making heroes out of those who steal government secrets and put them in newspapers." Richardson and Cox are sworn in.

MAY 29. Ziegler says it is constitutionally inappropriate for Nixon to testify before the Ervin Committee; would violate separation of powers.

MAY 30. Ehrlichman tells a Senate committee investigating CIA involvement that Nixon knew of the FBI investigation of the Mexican aspects of Watergate within 6 days of the break-in and that Nixon instructed him and Haldeman to have the CIA curb the FBI probe.

JUNE 3, 4. The New York Times and Washington Post report that Nixon and Dean met 35-40 times between January and April to discuss Watergate. Later, in a news conference on 9/15, Nixon says his 5/22 denial of knowledge and involvement still stands.

JUNE 11, 13. Agnew denounces prejudical publicity because of the televised Ervin Committee hearings. Ehrlichman admits some knowledge of the Fielding break-in, reversing his previous denials.

JUNE 27. The "enemies list" is released.

JULY 16-17. Butterfield, while testifying before the Senate committee, inadvertently reveals that Nixon has taped all conversations and phone calls in his offices and at Camp David. Ervin asks that the tapes be made available.

JULY 18. Cox asks for the tapes saying there can be no question of separation of powers since he is part of the executive.

JULY 23. Nixon refuses tapes to Ervin and Cox. They subpoena the tapes. Cox appeals to Sirica. Nixon still refuses.

JULY 26, 27. Nixon's attorney says he would abide by a "definitive decision of the highest court. Cox says any Supreme Court ruling is definitive. Warren maintains some are "less than definitive."

The White House brief to Sirica, 8/7, says "the President is answerable to the nation but not the courts" in the exercise of executive privilege.

AUG. 13. Cox's brief says the President has "no constitutional power to withhold evidence." Second Watergate Grand Jury is empaneled in Washington, D.C. A poll shows Nixon popularity, at 31%, lower than that of any other president in 20 years.

AUG. 16. Magruder pleads guilty to one count of obstruction of justice; sentencing postponed to see how valuable his testimony is.

AUG. 22. At a White House conference, Nixon calls Watergate "water under the bridge." He says he won't surrender the tapes but wants to return to the "real people's business."

AUG. 29, 30. Sirica asks Nixon for the tapes to enable him to rule on requests by Ervin and Cox. Nixon says he will appeal.

SEPT. 7, 10, 13. An appeal is taken to the Circuit Court. The 7 judges unanimously urge an out-of-court settlement with Cox and Nixon studying the tapes to decide which to release to the grand jury.

OCT. 10, 12. Vice-president Agnew resigns after pleading no contest to a charge of income tax evasion. Nixon nominates Ford as vice-president.

OCT. 12. U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals upholds Sirica's decision requiring Nixon to yield relevant tapes.

OCT. 16. Laird says he warned Nixon that an impeachment attempt might result from defiance of the court ruling on tapes - the first mention of impeachment by a White House official.

OCT. 19. Nixon proposes a compromise. He will give a summary of the tapes, verified by Stennis, to Ervin and Sirica. Ervin accepts; later reverses this when he discovers Nixon meant an edited, not verbatim transcript.

OCT. 20. Cox is fired; office of the special prosecutor is abolished. Richardson resigns; Ruckelshaus is fired for refusing to dismiss Cox. Bork, the solicitor general, who did agree to fire Cox, is named acting attorney general. (The events come to be known as the Saturday Night Massacre.)

OCT. 23, 24. Watergate-related bills are introduced in House and Senate; 22 in the House and 2 in the Senate call for impeachment.

OCT. 26. Nixon says a new special prosecutor will be appointed; calls media coverage "outrageous, vicious, distorted."

OCT. 30. House Judiciary Committee, William P. Rodino, chairman, begins consideration of possible impeachment.

NOV. 1. Nixon names William B. Saxbe, attorney general, and Leon Jaworski, special prosecutor.

NOV. 4. Calls for Nixon's resignation from Senator Brooke, newspapers, magazines, etc.; later from Senator Buckley.

NOV. 9. Six Watergate defendants are sentenced by Sirica (Hunt, 2½-8 years; Barker 1½-6 years; McCord, 1-5; Martinez, Sturgis, Gonzales 1-4.)

NOV. 12. Tapes of conversations of 6/20/72 and 4/15/73 being missing, Nixon promises Sirica his handwritten notes of these conversations. Nixon repeats that 3/21/73 was the first time certain Watergate facts were reported to him.

NOV. 14. U.S. Judge Gerhard Gesell calls the firing of Cox a violation of Justice Department regulations. An 18-minute gap in the 6/20/72 tape of a Nixon-Haldeman conversation is discovered. Testifying before Sirica on 11/26, Rose Mary Woods says she accidentally caused the tape erasure.

NOV. 17. At a televised Associated Press Editors Convention in Orlando, Florida, Nixon says, "People have got to know whether or not their president is a crook. Well, I'm not a crook."

NOV. 30. Krogh pleads guilty to violating the civil rights of Fielding adding he cannot in good conscience plead national security as a defense. A panel of electronics experts begins to examine the tape erasure.

DEC. 6. Haig says the 18-minute gap may have been caused by "some sinister force."

DEC. 8. Nixon releases his federal income tax returns for 1969-1972; says he will agree to any ruling by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue and Taxation.

DEC. 17, 19. A bill giving the U.S. District Court in Washington jurisdiction over the tapes subpoenaed by the Ervin Committee is passed without the President's signature. Three Watergate Committee subpoenas are served requesting almost 500 presidental tapes and documents.

DEC. 21. Jaworski gets sections of subpoenaed tapes from Sirica.

1974 JAN. 2. Internal Revenue Service says it will reexamine Nixon's returns.

JAN. 4. James D. St. Clair becomes head of the White House Watergate legal team. Nixon refuses Ervin's 12/19 subpoenas for tapes saying it "would unquestionably destroy any vestige of confidentiality of presidential communications."

JAN. 11. Saxbe says a president may be impeached only for indictable offenses.

JAN. 15. Electronics experts appointed by Sirica report that the 18-minute gap was caused by 5 separate erasures and re-recordings, not by accident.

JAN. 17. Nixon's brief refusing Ervin's request for tapes claims the President has power to withhold information from Congress if he determines it to be contrary to the public interest; charges the Ervin Committee with exceeding its authority by dealing with political questions.

JAN. 18. Sirica recommends grand jury investigation into possibly unlawful destruction of evidence by the White House.

JAN. 25, 26. Gesell rules too broad both Nixon's claim of executive privilege to withhold tapes and Ervin's request for the tapes. Ervin Committee postpones hearings to avoid prejudging the trial of Mitchell and Stans.

JAN. 29. In his State of the Union Message, Nixon calls for an end to Watergate probes and says he has no intention of resigning.

FEB. 6, 8. The House gives the Rodino Committee broad subpoena power. Nixon, in a letter to Gesell, refuses to give the Ervin Committee the 5 requested tapes. Gesell rules that Nixon does not have to turn over the tapes and that the courts can act in cases of conflict between a president and a Congressional committee.

FEB. 19. Senate Watergate Committee ends public hearings to yield to the courts and the House Judiciary Committee; the Mitchell-Stans trial begins.

FEB. 20. House Judiciary Committee attorneys conclude that grave offenses against the public interest are sufficient grounds for impeachment even if they are not actual legal crimes.

FEB. 22. Jaworski gives the Rodino Committee over 600 pages of documents and tapes.

FEB. 25, 26. Nixon tells a Federal Grand Jury he will not testify on Watergate. He also refuses to be a witness at the Ehrlichman California trial for the Fielding burglary.

MAR. 1. Seven former Nixon aides (Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Mardian, Parkinson, and Strachan) are indicted by the grand jury for conspiracy to hinder investigation of the Watergate burglary. Nixon is named an "unindicted co-conspirator" in the cover-up.

MAR. 6. Nixon says the 3/21/73 tapes might imply that he considered promising clemency to Watergate defendants or that he authorized payment of hush money but neither is true.

MAR. 11, 12. The White House leaks to the press a House Judiciary Committee request for 42 additional tapes. Ziegler hints that Nixon won't consider the request until after the Rodino Committee defines an impeachable offense. The New York Times reports that the Watergate Grand Jury believes Hunt's silence was bought less than 12 hours after a meeting of Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean on 3/21/73.

MAR. 13. Saxbe says the President has the same responsibility as any other citizen to report information with regard to crimes.

MAR. 18. Sirica rules that the House Judiciary Committee may obtain the Watergate Grand Jury report and all other material relating to possible presidential involvement in Watergate matters. Nixon appeals. Sirica is upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals on 5/21/73.

MAR. 21. Jaworski reveals he will continue to subpoena White House material.

MAR. 29. The White House says it will turn over all material subpoenaed by Jaworski.

APR. 2. Jaworski charges Nixon has withheld information. The White House says Nixon has yielded "all relevant material" sought.

APR. 3. The White House says Nixon will pay $432,787.13 plus interest in back taxes.

APR. 9. The White House tells the Rodino Committee it needs more time to consider the request for tapes.

APR. 18. Rodino rejects White House compromise to turn over portions of tapes and documents relevant to the impeachment inquiry.

APR. 19. Gesell asks Jaworski to turn over any evidence linking Nixon to the Fielding break-in.

APR. 23, 25. The White House asks a 5-day extension. The Rodino Committee confirms that it is requesting additional tapes regarding the alleged cover-up, the ITT case, and dairy industry contributions; also that it is considering 7 areas of allegations against the President.

APR. 28. Mitchell and Stans are acquitted.

APR. 29, 30. On television, Nixon dramatically announces he is making public everything relevant to Watergate. Rodino insists he needs the actual tapes. Nixon says his 1308 pages of edited tapes tell the whole story. (The falsity of this comes out later in the cover-up trial.)

MAY 1. The Judiciary Committee rejects the edited transcripts and formally declares the President failed to comply with the Committee's subpoena. St. Clair says Nixon won't yield tapes and documents sought by Jaworski.

MAY 2. The House Judiciary Committee votes to give St. Clair wide latitude in questioning witnesses at the impeachment hearings and to allow live television coverage.

MAY 4. The White House steps up its campaign to discredit John W. Dean.

MAY 6, 7. Nixon says he is willing to reach an accommodation on Jaworski's request for tapes. He reverses himself the next day.

MAY 9. The House Judiciary Committee formally begins its inquiry into the conduct of Nixon.

MAY 10, 11, 12. The White House calls rumors of resignation ridiculous.

MAY 14. A House committee reports that 17 million dollars of federal funds were spent on Nixon's homes.

MAY 15. Chapin is sentenced to a minimum of 10 months for lying to a grand jury about political sabatoge in the 1972 campaign.

MAY 16. Kleindienst pleads guilty to a minor charge of lying to a Senate committee about the ITT case, gets a suspended sentence on 6/7.

MAY 20. Sirica orders Nixon to turn over subpoenaed tapes and other records.

MAY 21. Magruder is sentenced for his role in the break-in and cover-up.

MAY 22. Nixon refuses and says he will continue to refuse subpoenas of the Rodino Committee for additional tapes.

MAY 24. Jaworski appeals directly to the Supreme Court for support of his effort to subpoena 64 presidential office conversations. Gesell rules that a President has no right to authorize break-in and search without a warrant even if national security is involved.

MAY 25. Nixon reiterates he must defend the presidency by refusing to turn over evidence sought in two major Watergate criminal cases.

JUNE 3. Colson pleads guilty to one charge of obstructing justice in connection with the first Ellsberg trial; sentenced on 6/21.

JUNE 15. The Supreme Court agrees to decide whether a grand jury may name Nixon a co-conspirator without indicting him.

JUNE 17. Kalmbach is sentenced for illegal fund-raising activities.

JUNE 20. Transcripts made available by Rodino Committee show many significant differences from edited transcripts released by the White House. The committee says on 6/25 that it will make all its evidence public.

JUNE 27. Nixon's lawyers begin his impeachment defense before the House Judiciary Committee. Administration spokesmen accuse Rodino of bias.

JUNE 29. The Senate Select Committee on Watergate (Ervin Committee) is officially dissolved. Its last official action on 7/13 is to propose sweeping overhaul of campaign statutes to prevent another Watergate.

JULY 1. Rodino agrees to call all witnesses proposed by Nixon's counsel.

JULY 7. The Supreme Court begins hearings on two matters affecting Nixon and his aides. It rules on 7/24 that Nixon must turn over documents subpoenaed for the cover-up trials.

JULY 12. Ehrlichman is found guilty of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of Fielding; sentenced on 7/31.

JULY 16. Evidence released by House Judiciary Committee suggests that Nixon tried to use the Internal Revenue Service to harass political enemies.

JULY 18. The House Judiciary Committee produces volumes of evidence challenging Nixon's contention that national security was the sole basis for White House-approved wiretaps and "plumbers" operations.

JULY 19. The Rodino Committee presents the case for impeachment to its members.

JULY 20. Nixon calls Watergate the "thinnest scandal in American history."

JULY 27. By vote of 27 to 11 the House Judiciary Committee approves the first article of impeachment - obstruction of justice.

JULY 29. The committee approves the second article of impeachment - abuse of constitutional authority.

Connally is indicted for bribery, perjury, etc., connected with the milk producers case.

JULY 30. The House Judiciary Committee approves a third article of impeachment - for unconstitutionally defying subpoenas.

AUG. 1. The House sets Aug. 19 as the tentative date to open impeachment debate. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. are fined for illegal campaign contributions.

AUG. 2. Dean is sentenced for his admitted role in the Watergate cover-up.

AUG. 4. Seven Republicans and 3 conservative Democrats join the Committee majority in recommending impeachment.

AUG. 5. Nixon admits that 6 days after the Watergate burglary he ordered a halt to the investigation for political as well as national security reasons; he also admits to keeping this information from his lawyers and from supporters on the Rodino Committee.

AUG. 6. Nixon tells his Cabinet he will not resign.

AUG. 7. Nixon announces his resignation effective Aug. 9.

AUG. 9. Gerald R. Ford becomes the 38th president of the United States and calls on the nation to bind the wounds of Watergate.

Postscript to "Watergate," after the Nixon resignation.

AUG. The impeachment inquiry formally ends as the House votes 412-3 to accept the report of the Rodino Committee recommending impeachment. The committee publishes its final report on 8/22. Sirica postpones the cover-up trial for 3 weeks to clarify Nixon's status. Immediately following the resignation there is a stock market rally and foreigners increase their investments in American industry.

SEPT. On September 8, to the complete surprise of the American people and his own staff, President Ford issues to Nixon, as an act of compassion, ".....a full, free and absolute pardon....for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974." In accepting the pardon, Nixon admits no guilt; he recites the achievements of his administration and casually concedes "mistakes and misjudgments made

in the best interest of the Nation." Ford also asks Congress to vote Nixon $850,000 for post-resignation expenses, more than twice the sum fixed by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963. This, plus the proportionate share of his $600,000, would amount to 1.7 million to be paid to Nixon for the first six months of his transition to ex-president. Both the pardon and the request for funds cause immediate and widespread protest, including the resignation of Ford's press secretary, and a noticeable decline in Ford's popularity.

OCT. The Watergate cover-up trial finally begins against Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian, and Parkinson. The case against Colson is dropped when he pleads guilty to lesser charges in the Pentagon Papers case. The case against Strachan is separated from that of the other five alleged conspirators to permit a ruling on his petition to dismiss the charges.

NOV. The Watergate effect leads to heavy Republican losses at the polls. Nixon's "exile in his Western Elba" is interrupted by hospitalization.

DEC. Although several defendants say his testimony is crucial to their defense, Sirica excuses Nixon from testifying because of his illness. The tapes played at the trial prove beyond a doubt that Nixon lied repeatedly. Twenty-eight White House tapes, never before heard, most of them in Nixon's own voice, prove that, if prosecuted, it could readily be proved that Nixon 1) had a demonstrable motive for the cover-up, 2) that he tried to turn off the FBI Watergate inquiry during its first critical days, 3) that Nixon agreed to and finally directed offers of Executive clemency to keep potentially dangerous witnesses in line, 4) that Nixon acquiesced in payoffs to buy the silence of the seven original Watergate burglars, 5) that Nixon had and showed guilty knowledge of the criminal acts committed by people in his behalf, and 6) that Nixon knew as early as 4/25/73 that he faced impeachment if all the facts became known. The case is summed up for the jury on 12/20.

Simultaneously, the Washington grand jury ends its deliberations. In 30 months it has handed up indictments against 30 top Nixon aides.

Before the trial is over new revelations again shock the nation. The CIA is accused of a huge domestic surveillance operation (beginning long before Nixon's Huston plan but peaking under Nixon) with electronic surveillance, break-ins, and files on about 100,000 Americans identified with the anti-Viet Nam War groups and with civil rights groups and including some Congressmen. Vice-

President Rockefeller is promptly chosen by Ford to head a group investigating the charges against the CIA.

Congress votes $200,000 in addition to his pension to Nixon for the 6-month transition period, paring Ford's request considerably. But in the first 3 months, Nixon had already spent $367,000 for which he was reimbursed. Nor did this sum include the cost of the Secret Service nor of other government services which benefit Nixon. As reported by The New York Times of January 11, 1975, Nixon transition costs borne by the American people include $154,000 for staff salaries and expenses, $83,000 rental fee for storage space for Nixon records and gifts, $76,000 for maintenance of federal facilities at San Clemente and Key Biscayne, $20,000 for carrier flights, $16,000 for travel, $14,000 for office facilities, $4,000 for communications.

1975 JAN. After deliberating for 15 hours on 3 days, the jury renders the verdict in the cover-up trial: Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mardian, Mitchell, guilty; Parkinson, not guilty. The jury of 9 women and 3 men place a seal of finality on the seamiest episode of our time. Sentences of up to 25 years each are possible; appeals may take 2 or 3 years. Meantime, Dean, Kalmbach, and Magruder are released from prison on order of Judge Sirica. The Justice Department considers prosecution of John Connally, Gordon Strachan, Maurice Stans, Frank de Marco, Bebe Rebozo, Rose Mary Woods, and others connected with Watergate. Of all involved in the affair, Nixon alone cannot be charged with any wrongdoing; he has already been pardoned.

FEB. Colson is released from prison. Of the more than 60 individuals and corporations who either pleaded guilty or were convicted, not a single one is now in prison. The Justice Department gets a new head with Edward H. Levi, former president of the University of Chicago, as attorney general. The successor to Mitchell, Kleindienst, Richardson, and Saxbe inherits the task of completing the Watergate prosecutions. The Watergate principals begin to capitalize on their experiences. Nixon getsadvance royalties for the projected publication of his side of the Watergate story. Dean is on the lecture circuit; his first talk to an audience of 7000 at the University of Virginia brings him $4000. There is opposition to talks by Ron Ziegler.

The presidential transition period is over for Nixon. He will now receive from the American people only $600,000 a year as a pension, $200,000 a year for office expenses, plus the pensions he acquired while a congressman and vice-president. He will also receive services from various units of the government, the total value of which is not to exceed $96,000 a year.

One further aftermath is Nixon's continued legal battle to win custody of his presidential tapes and papers. Federal Judge Rickey has ruled that with the exception of selected personal items the material belongs to the government. According to The New York Times of February 2, 1975, "the ruling will not take effect while it is being appealed."